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September 23, 1959.

KHRUSHCHEV VISIT
Washington
September 1959

SCHEDULE OF TALKS AT CAMP DAVID

I. Tentative List of Officials Staying at Camp David

a. United States:

Secretary Herter
Deputy Under Secretary Merchant
Ambassador Thompson
Acting Assistant Secretary Kohler
Mr. Akalovsky, Interpreter

b. Soviet Officials:

Chairman Khrushchev
Mr. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Menshikov
Mr. Soldatov, Chief of the American Department
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Troyanovsky, Assistant to Mr. Khrushchev,
Interpreter

II. Agreed Agenda Items

a. Saturday morning, September 26:

(1) Germany and Berlin

U.S. Standby Officer: Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand,
Director, Office of
German Affairs

Soviet Standby Officer: Mr. W. N. Lunkov,
Official of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs


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By DAH, NARS Date 6/28/76



MAJOR BRIEFING PAPERS

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Tactics for Conversation with Him

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 - Japanese Peace Treaty and USSR-East German
Peace Treaty C
2. Disarmament
 - Arms Control D
 - Collective Security, Atom Free Zones, and
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3. Nuclear Tests
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Sunday Morning

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Themes of Khrushchev's Statements in the U. S.

US Disarmament Proposals



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(2) Disarmament

U.S. Standby Officers: Mr. Philip Farley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Disarmament and Atomic Energy

Mr. John N. Irwin, II,
Assistant Secretary of
Defense (International
Security Affairs)

Soviet Standby Officer: Mr. A.A. Sobolev, Permanent Soviet Delegate to the United Nations

(3) Nuclear Tests

U.S. Standby Officers: Mr. John McCone, Chairman,
Atomic Energy Commission

Mr. John N. Irwin II

Mr. Philip Farley

Soviet Standby Officer: None designated

b. Saturday afternoon, September 26:

(4) Exchanges and Contacts

U.S. Standby Officers: Ambassador William S.B. Lacy,
Special Assistant to the
Secretary of State for
East-West Contacts

Mr. George B. Allen,
Director, USIA

Soviet Standby Officer: Mr. G.A. Zhukov, Chairman
of the State Committee for
Cultural Relations with
Foreign Countries

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(5) Nuclear Reactor Information

U.S. Standby Officers: Mr. John McCone
Mr. Philip Farley

Soviet Standby Officers: V.S. Yemelyanov, Chief of
the Main Administration
for the Use of Atomic
Energy

(6) Political Treaty and Other Bilateral Questions

(7) Laos and Iran

U.S. Standby Officers: Mr. J. Graham Parsons,
Assistant Secretary for
Far Eastern Affairs

G. Lewis Jones, Assistant
Secretary for Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs

c. Sunday morning, September 27:

(8) Trade

U.S. Standby Officer: Under Secretary of State
Dillon

(9) Possible Summit Meeting

(10) Final Communique

U.S. Standby Officer: Mr. Andrew Berding,
Assistant Secretary for
Public Affairs

III. Items Not on Agreed Agenda

Those which U.S. may wish to raise:

International Communism
Eastern Europe
Soviet Support for Chinese Aggressive Policies
U.S. Relations with Communist China
United Nations
International Atomic Energy Agency

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Those which Soviets may raise:

International Cooperation in Outer Space
Restrictions on the Import of Communist Propaganda
The Near East
U.S.-Soviet Civil Aviation Agreement
Possible Announcement of IRBM Agreement with Turkey

It is envisaged that these items not on the agreed agenda may be discussed in informal talks on Friday and Saturday evenings.

Arrangements for Standby Officers will be made if required.



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KHRUSHCHEV VISIT

Camp David

September 25 - 27, 1959

U.S. Objectives in Khrushchev Visit and Suggested
Tactics for Conversation with Him

I. U.S. Objectives

Our key purpose should be to impress on Khrushchev the urgent need of a serious search for ways to reduce the dangers inherent in the present situation and of seeking an acceptable basis for improved relations.

In pursuing this purpose we should try:

- A. To make Khrushchev understand that, if the USSR continues to act on its view that the balance of power is shifting to the Soviet bloc and to attempt to enforce its will on non-Communist countries (Berlin and Laos are current examples), the risks of war will increase, as we intend to honor our commitments. Arms limitation and control will then become difficult if not impossible and the U.S. will be forced to intensify its defense preparations.
- B. To convince Khrushchev of our sincere interest in arms control but to make it unmistakably clear that adequate inspection and control is the minimum price at which it can be achieved.
- C. To point out the benefits to both sides of better relations but to emphasize that competition in peaceful fields must be conducted according to accepted ground rules applicable to both sides.

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II. Probable

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II. Probable Khrushchev Line

Khrushchev will press for "peaceful coexistence." ¹ line and portion of another excised, Exempt, GDS E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(B)(1) /his September 18 address to the UN General Assembly, his speeches and conversations while on tour of the U.S., as well as the current Soviet line suggest that he will make or imply the following points:

- A. The world must recognize that Soviet power guarantees the permanence of existing Communist regimes. "Peaceful competition" must proceed elsewhere.
- B. Both the U.S. and USSR recognize each other's power and are familiar with the differences between the capitalist and communist systems. Both powers should respect the other's vested interests.
- C. There are many mutual advantages in a US-Soviet accommodation on major international issues.
- D. Expanded trade is the best road to improved US-Soviet relations.
- E. Arms control would free both sides for other advantageous activity. The USSR is willing to go all the way to total disarmament.
- F. US bases abroad are the major impediment to agreement on arms control and to better bilateral relations.
- G. "Re-militarization of Germany is the major threat to peace and progress on the German question.
- H. A summit conference should be convened to discuss vital issues as decisions can only be reached on that level.

III. Agenda

- A. Secretary Herter and Mr. Gromyko agreed to ten agenda items on September 16. These items

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cover most of the major issues that will arise during the Camp David talks and are listed in the index. Both sides have reserved the right to raise additional topics. Owing to the time factor it probably would be most advantageous to raise such items during general discussions for which Friday and Saturday evenings were mentioned during the meeting on September 16 between the Secretary and Mr. Gromyko.

- B. The President may wish to raise the following non-agenda items:

Soviet Control of International Communism
Eastern Europe
Soviet Support for Chinese Communist
Aggressive Policies
US Relations with Communist China



- C. Khrushchev may raise the following items not on the agenda:

International Cooperation in Use Outer Space
Restrictions on the Import of Communist
Propaganda
The Near East
US-Soviet Civil Aviation Relations
Possible Announcement of IRBM Agreement with
Turkey during Visit

IV. Tactics

- A. The President may wish to utilize his first business conversation with Khrushchev to emphasize his disbelief that the USSR thinks it can dislodge the Western powers from Berlin in view of their categorical commitments to the German people. An aggressive Soviet policy toward the US and its allies and a revolutionary Soviet policy in underdeveloped areas is too risky in view of military technological developments. The Soviet expansionist policy pursued in earlier decades is obsolete. The US has not given up its policy of aiding countries

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from being drawn into the Bloc against their will because of the "sputnik." Continued Soviet pressures will, of course, meet our determined resistance and the risk of war will remain and probably increase. We hope Khrushchev appreciated this point during his tour of the US.


- B. The President might find it useful to stress the following additional points during the course of the conversations:
- a. Better relations between the US and USSR are possible if the Sino-Soviet Bloc gives up its policy of pressure and crisis.
 - b. Failure of USSR to respond to the President's suggestion for a flexible Soviet position at Geneva has resulted in a distinctly less favorable atmosphere for conducting conversations on major international issues.
 - c. The President and American people cannot understand why the Bloc should have chosen this particular time to instigate another dangerous crisis in Laos.
 - d. We believe strongly in greater exchange of persons, ideas and culture as a practical step to better the current unsatisfactory state of East-West relations.
 - e. US is not willing to submerge US-Soviet differences in meaningless camaraderie. President and American people are well aware of Communist ambitions regarding the US and other countries. We are in deadly earnest, however, in seeking to find a basis for confining the competition to peaceful fields.

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- f. While US is opposed to forceful change in various parts of the world, it does not oppose peaceful change. Machinery already exists for this; USSR should participate more constructively in the UN.
 - g. Disarmament must be approached in a realistic framework. We will study latest Soviet proposal carefully but must emphasize that effective inspection and control are basic US positions on disarmament.
 - h. There are two paths to a summit conference: substantial progress toward a settlement at the Foreign Ministers level, or a public statement by Khrushchev indicating a new and constructive approach toward Berlin.
- C. [4 lines and portion of another excised and exempt from declassification, per E.O. 11652 Sec. 5(B)(1) State Dept. ltr. 6/10/76
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However, Khrushchev is a forceful person and given to long harangues on topics which he considers of vital importance to the Soviet regime. The President may find it desirable to make it clear that the usefulness of the talks and the possibility of a summit conference would be greatly reduced if exchanges of views become temperamental.

V. Joint Communiqué.

It will be difficult, if not impossible, to avoid a joint communiqué. Secretary Herter and Mr. Gromyko agreed on September 16 that the experts might work on sections of the communiqué after discussion of each agenda item is concluded. A US draft communiqué, drawn up to exclude language which the Soviets may favor but which we wish to avoid, has been prepared for use as a starter.

VI. Over-All

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VI. Over-All U.S.-Soviet Relations

Khrushchev's conduct of Soviet foreign policy has been characterized by two divergent tendencies. (1) He has expanded the area of normal intercourse between the USSR and non-Communist countries, eliminated some major points of friction in Soviet international relations, engaged more actively in multi-lateral international endeavors and organizations and permitted greater Soviet contact with the outside world. He has also shown some evidence of a wish to negotiate seriously on at least some aspects of arms limitation. (2) He has asserted that Communism will spread throughout the world and his intent to assist the process. He authored the current Soviet line that the balance of power is shifting to the Sino-Soviet bloc and he has tried to capitalize politically on the anticipated shift of power in order to weaken the positions of countries opposing the USSR.

Khrushchev can be expected to deny vehemently the second tendency, stress his allegiance to the first which he calls "peaceful coexistence" and maintain that steps be taken to improve U.S.-Soviet relations as a means of further decreasing world tensions. He probably will claim, as he has frequently during the past week, that his trip to the U.S. is in itself evidence of good intentions and a desire for better relations. Among his more likely proposals may be a U.S.-Soviet trade agreement; a U.S.-Soviet non-aggression pact, friendship treaty or agreement on the non-use of force; some proposal for expanded exchanges or an agreement to cooperate in peaceful use of atomic energy. He will probably claim that U.S. bases encircling the USSR are a major impediment to improved U.S.-USSR relations and to progress in arms control negotiations.

The President may wish to point out these two tendencies in Soviet policy. To underscore our awareness of the tendency to aggressive expansionism he could refer to Berlin, the cynical Soviet pressure on the Shah of Iran,

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consisting of vicious propaganda alternated with blandishments, the current Communist subversion attempts in Laos, Soviet support for provocative actions of the Chinese Communists against Taiwan, Soviet encouragement of Communist disruptive activities in Latin America, and particularly to Soviet threats of nuclear destruction to its neighbors.

The President might state that Khrushchev has an historic responsibility before him in deciding the future course of Soviet foreign policy. History could record him as a leading statesman if he helped to remove the burden of fear and sacrifice imposed by the armaments race. The U.S. and the USSR would then be able to confine their competition to peaceful fields. Of course, the ground rules would have to be agreed, -- and the competition, in ideas as well as the economic and cultural fields, would have to take place within the Communist as well as in the non-Communist world. The prospects for expanded economic relations and even for cooperation against the world's want, ignorance, and disease would then be bright.

The President might urge Khrushchev to review some of the concepts on which Soviet policy traditionally has been based. These policies have been rendered obsolete by social reforms in the non-communist world and by technological developments. In his report to the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee on February 15, 1956, Khrushchev stated:

"There is no doubt that in a number of capitalist countries violent overthrow of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the sharp aggravation of class struggle connected with this are inevitable. But the forms of social revolution vary. And it is not true that we regard violence and civil war as the only way to remake society."



We have made our position clear that we will aid countries who wish to avoid being dragged into the Sino-Soviet Bloc

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against their will. This is especially important to us as long as nations are not permitted to secede from the Bloc, as demonstrated by Hungary in 1956. If the Soviets instigate and support the violent overthrow of the established system in non-communist countries, a direct confrontation of US and Soviet interests will result.

The pursuit of an aggressive course can only lead to an intensification of the arms race, thus increasing the danger of war. Khrushchev has seen the industrial strength and productivity of this country. He will also have seen that the U.S. economy is now geared primarily to the satisfaction of popular wants. This is the path we prefer. It is not the only one we can follow. In three years during the last World War when we channeled our industrial energies to produce for national objectives, we doubled our production. If we are forced to, we can redirect a greater section of our economy to such objectives now, to armaments, to foreign assistance, both military and economic, and to other national objectives. The USSR would presumably respond in kind; the people of both our countries would suffer, but the USSR would have left us no other choice and Khrushchev would bear a grave responsibility before the world.

Khrushchev has counselled patience in our relations and expressed frequently his confidence in Communism's superiority. It would seem the height of folly to endanger the achievements in both countries by impetuous acts designed to hasten unduly what he considers inevitable historical processes, especially when we have demonstrated our willingness to permit changes to occur peacefully.



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CONFIDENTIAL German Reunification Sat. a.m.

We cannot be party to any agreement committing us to indefinite partition of Germany, including recognition of GDR. ✓

Peace treaty with two parts of Germany would perpetuate, not eliminate, war-created tensions which arise chiefly from division of Germany. Present situation dangerous to US and USSR. Best way to eliminate danger is to build reunified Germany into European system of multilateral controls based on consent -- not force -- thus preventing unilateral adventures.



Right of self-determination essential to lasting stability. Denial this right to 1/3 Germany counter to this basic requirement. (If Khrushchev mentions failure to hold elections in Viet-Nam, you should reply this no parallel. US not party to Geneva Agreements of 1954; conditions South Viet-Nam not comparable.)

We cannot consider European security agreement confirming division of Germany. This would perpetuate explosive situation. But Western Peace Plan provides basis for discussion and framework for exploring possibility of re-deploying forces in Central Europe.

German reunification a Four-Power responsibility. USSR recognized this at Geneva Summit Meeting of 1955.

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Berlin

Saturday a.m.

Why is K. so anxious to end occupation status Berlin? Our troops do not operate as occupation troops. They protect population from openly demonstrated hostility of East German regime.

Berlin a vital interest of US. Fully committed to protect West Berlin. American people will honor this commitment.

No real hope of better understanding between US and USSR while USSR continues threats of abandoning its Berlin obligations.

Berlin should be practical case of co-existence. If it creates difficulties for Communists, this due to nature East German regime. Mere existence of free part of Germany, whether Berlin or Federal Republic, will exert powerful attraction for East German population deprived of right of self-determination.

Real solution - reunification of Germany. However, lacking that, any acceptable provisional arrangement on Berlin must respect the rights of all parties without threat of unilateral repudiation of agreements.

We are not in a position, of course, to prevent the USSR from making internal arrangements with the GDR, but these cannot abolish Western legal rights.



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Parallel with Japanese Treaty
(Germany and Berlin)

No parallel between Japanese Peace Treaty and
separate Soviet treaty with GDR

Japanese Treaty negotiated with freely
elected government of united country.

Signed by 42 countries in 1951.

Soviet treaty would be with non-
representative govt in control only
1/3 of Germany.

Soviet treaty would not affect Western
legal rights in Germany.

USSR itself participated in Japanese Peace Treaty
Conference but decided not sign treaty.

While certain administrative matters
affecting Soviets may have been affected
by treaty from Jap. standpoint, Soviet
officials remained in Japan until diplo-
matic relations restored.

US certainly did not attempt regulate rela-
tionship between USSR and Japan.

Rule of international law that rights and
duties of others can only be created or
modified by agreements to which they
are party.



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KHRUSHCHEV VISIT
Camp David Session
September 1959

RESERVE BRIEFING PAPERS

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Items Not on Agenda Which President May Wish to Raise

International Communism	A
Eastern Europe	B
Soviet Support for Chinese Communist Aggressive Policies	C
US Relations with Communist China	D

Items Not on Agenda Which Soviets May Raise

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The Near East	C
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